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ABSTRACT

The progression toward reevaluating patent validity in the
administrative, rather than judicial, setting became overtly
substitutionary in the America Invents Act. No longer content to
encourage court litigants to rely on Patent Office expertise for faster,
cheaper, and more accurate validity decisions, Congress in the AIA took
steps to force a choice. The result is an emergent border between court
and agency power in the U.S. patent system. By design, the border is not
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University Dwight Look College of Engineering; Fellow, Duke Law Center for Innovation Policy.
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absolute. Concurrent activity in both settings over the same dispute
remains possible. What is troubling is the systematic weakening of this
border by Patent Office encroachments on powers Congress left to the
courts. This Article traces the statutory roots of those encroachments,
their initial encouragement by the Supreme Court's 2016 Cuozzo
decision, and the recent resistance to their further expansion by the en
banc FederalCircuit's2018 Wi-Fi One decision. Section I introduces the
institutional history that underpins these developments. Section II
summarizes the reallocation of ex post validity review power from the
districtcourts to the Patent Office over the last thirdof a century, putting
important attributes of Patent Office review into an administrative law
context. Section III describes the particularpowers being reallocatedand
discusses the importance of these powers to a well-functioning system for
governing innovation as patent law seeks to do. Section IV reviews the
recent en banc Federal Circuit decision in Wi-Fi One v. Broadcom and
discusses its implicationsfor the patentpowers at stake.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's renewed interest in patent law over the past 15
years reveals a striking preoccupation with administrative power. Since
Professor John Duffy in 2002 predicted "a return of the Supreme Court to
the field of patent law,"' the Court has decided an average of about three
patent cases per year.2 Of these, five decisions and the two most recent
grants of certiorari were cases concerned quite directly with
administrative process.3 Another eight cases were about core
requirements for patentability and were decided with the quality of the
Patent Office administrative examination process in the mid-ground.4
This brief history of modern Supreme Court patent jurisprudence is
also a mixed one. Part of the Court's administrative turn was a necessary
reaction to the 2011 America Invents Act (AIA), which created a suite of
new Patent Office proceedings to reevaluate the validity of issued
patents.' Various features of these controversial proceedings were
litigated almost immediately, and the Court could not long have avoided
resolving at least some institutional questions. Yet the Court itself was a
1. John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of
Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 283 (2002).
2.

See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Supreme CourtPatentCases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION BLOG,

www.writtendescription.blogspot.com/p/patents-scotus.html [https://perma.cc/LVP5-XEJL].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
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significant mover toward administrative adjudication in patent law. Its
1999 decision in Dickinson v. Zurko rejected the relatively undeferential
review that the Patent Office long received in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit,6 which has virtually exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over patent-related cases.7 The Court in Zurko also confirmed
that the Patent Office was subject to the Administrative Procedure Act,
heralding a decline in the agency's exceptional treatment amid the modem
administrative state.'
Since then, academic interest in the administrative process of patent
law has grown considerably. Scholars have studied many contexts where
administrative law appears to treat the patent system differently and
concluded either that exceptionalism is inapt 9 or that it is justified on the
merits.io The argument from historical practice alone is ever-diminishing.
In one respect, this renewed engagement with patent law's historical
insulation from administrative law was necessary. Historically, allocation
of power between the Patent Office and the courts was a relatively brightline matter. The agency had plenary power ex ante to examine inventions
and issue or deny patents. Once a patent issued, the courts had virtually
plenary power ex post to adjudicate infringement, give remedies, and
revisit validity issues." As the power to reevaluate patent validity ex post
increasingly moved to the Patent Office through legislation, the salience
of administrative power in patent law grew as well, forming an
unmistakable break from historical practice. To manage a break of this
sort requires theory, not mere habit, and one may reasonably understand

6. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 165 (1999).
7. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1295(a)(4) (2012).
8. Peter Lee, Supreme Assimilation in Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1433 (2016).
9. See, e.g., Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 899 (2017)
(arguing that Patent Office technology classifications are informal adjudications of fact merit
deference under the APA); Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron
Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959 (2013) (arguing that Patent Office
interpretations of core patentability requirement statutes merit Chevron deference); Kali Murray, First
Things First: A Principled Approach to Patent Administrative Law, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 29
(arguing, inter alia, that the Patent Office can-contrary to conventional wisdom in patent doctrineengage in substantive rulemaking and receive at least some judicial deference for the rules that result).
10. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO as PrimeMover, 65 DUKE
L.J. 1657 (2016) (arguing that even the new AIA proceedings do not delegate interpretive authority
to the Patent Office, making Chevron deference inappropriate); Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law
in the Administrative State, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127 (2000) (arguing that the patent system
should, as a wholesale matter, resist assimilation into ordinary principles of administrative law
because of conceptual and normative differences between patent law and the modem regulatory state).
11. The Patent Office retained modest powers ex post to reissue patents and make certain other
technical corrections, but full reevaluation of the merits of the patent grant traditionally took place in
Article III courts.
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the literature on patent exceptionalism as a foundation for broader debate
about how power should be allocated among institutions in the patent
system.
By now, the Court's stake in this broader debate is clear. In a trilogy
of cases 12 directed to the AIA proceedings conducted in the agency's
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), the Court has taken up essential
questions of administrative power, up to and including the
constitutionality of post-grant administrative review. Moreover, the
Court's patent jurisprudence has vindicated not only Professor Duffy's
prediction of more frequent involvement in patent cases but also his
suggestion that a key contribution of the Court would be to police the
borders among the Patent Office, the U.S. district courts, and the Federal
Circuit.' 3 The Court would do well at border-policing precisely because
it is relatively "detached" from the operational detail of patent law, even
in a time of generous certiorari.14
This Article evaluates the borders of court and agency power in the
patent system in light of the Supreme Court's ongoing supervision as well
as the structural choices of the Patent Office and lower courts. Section II
summarizes the progressive reallocation of expost validity review power
from the district courts to the Patent Office over the last third of a century,
putting important attributes of Patent Office review into an administrative
law context. Section III describes the particular powers being reallocated
and discusses the importance of these powers to a well-functioning system
for governing innovation as patent law seeks to do. Section IV reviews
the recent en banc Federal Circuit decision in Wi-Fi One v. Broadcom and
discusses its implications for the patent powers at stake.
II. RECEDING JUDICIAL POWER IN PATENT LAW

The story of power transfer from the courts to the Patent Office is a
story about favoring certain values incrementally, but persistently, over
time and favoring institutions that optimize them. The values themselves
are familiar in adjudication: expertise, manageable cost, and broad access.
Naturally, these values come at a cost, and the arc of the story also reflects
competing accounts of the overall benefit.

12. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2239
(June 12, 2017) (No. 16-712); SAS Inst. Inc. v. Lee, cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (May 22, 2017)
(No. 16-969); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
13. Duffy, The Festo Decision, supra note 1, at 302-03 (suggesting that "[a]rbitrating
institutional claims to power" would be a task for which the Court is institutionally well suited).
14. Id.

2017]
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The power to adjudicate patent validity ex post was first transferred
from the courts to the Patent Office in 1980 with the creation of ex parte
reexamination.'" Until then, the validity of issued patents was reevaluated
in courts, either as a defense in an infringement lawsuit'I or in an action
for declaratory relief." Ex parte reexamination began with a petition to
the Patent Office challenging the validity of one or more patent claims
and explaining the grounds for the challenge.'" If the petition presented a
"substantial new question of patentability," then reexamination would
proceed between the patent owner and an examiner in the same ex parte
fashion as the initial examination of a patent application.' 9 The next
transfer of power came in 1999 with inter partes reexamination, which
kept both the ability of third parties to request review and the need for a
substantial new question of patentability.20 It also added a party into the
mix. Although each step in an inter partes reexamination began with an
Office action by the examiner and a response by the patent owner-in a
familiar ex parte colloquy-the third-party requester was now able to file
comments addressing the examiner's and patent owner's arguments. 2
The principal motivations for these administrative mechanisms were
the relative inexpertise of judges and juries in technical matters, the cost
of litigation, and constrained access from Article III standing
requirements. 22 As an agency extensively populated with trained scientists
and engineers and experienced in applying the rules of patent law to
technical inventions, the Patent Office reflected a more expert forum. 23
With respect to cost, reexamination did offer a cheaper alternative. In
2004-2005, the typical (median) cost of legal services for an ex parte
proceeding was $7,500.24 For an inter partes proceeding inclusive of all

15. Act ofDec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015.
16. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) (2012).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012). See also Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem.
Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176 (1965).
18. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
19. Id. §§ 303(a), 305.
20. Act of Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501; 35 U.S.C. §§ 311, 312(a)
(2010).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b)(2) (2010).
22. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic Decision Making in Dual
PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 51-55 (2016) (discussing
motivations for administrative, rather than judicial, review of patent validity).
23. See Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, supra note 9, at 903-04 (describing the
substantive expertise of patent examiners).
24.
AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 18 (2005).
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patent owner responses, the cost was $40,000.25 By contrast, for the
lowest-stakes category of litigation, where less than $1 million was at
stake, the typical cost of legal services was higher by an order of
magnitude; $350,000 through the end of discovery and $650,000 total.2 6
Access to agency review was universal. Reexamination could be
requested by "any person at any time," including the patent owner, in ex
parte27 as well as inter partes proceedings.2 8 Unsuccessful challengers
who wished to appeal to the Federal Circuit still had to show Article III
standing, 2 9 but the agency's door was quite open. Significantly, ex parte
reexamination could also be initiated on the Director's initiative.30
Although rare, Director-initiated reexamination bypassed the need for a
reexamination petition and could take place at any time during the term
of the patent.31
The adjudicatory virtues-expertise, reduced cost, and broad
access-that these reexamination proceedings embody are even more
pronounced and actively tailored in AIA patent validity reviews.3 2 Rather
than patent examiner staff in the Central Reexamination Unit, AIA
proceedings are conducted right from the start before panels of three
administrative patent judges, lending even greater competence in patent
law and expertise in technical subject matter.33 By investing authority in
the agency's PTAB to conduct full administrative trials, the AIA makes
administrative adjudication a realistic choice not just for low-stakes
disputes but also for patent litigation involving tens of millions of dollars.
In comparison to those amounts in controversy, PTAB reviews often
reflect even greater relative savings in cost.
As to broad access, however, PTAB reviews under the AIA are more
nuanced than reexamination. In all three types of AIA proceedings, the
patent owner may not seek review.34 Those who have previously filed

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

[d. at 23.
Id. at 22.
35 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
Id. § 311 (1999).
Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
37 C.F.R. § 1.520 (2018).
USPTO, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2239 (9th ed. 2015).
See Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supranote 22, at 5 8-64 (discussing the features of inter

partes review, covered business method review, and post-grant review under the AIA).
Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Youngest Patent Validity Proceeding: EvaluatingPost-Grant
33.

Review, 24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 333, 347 (2016); Eric C. Cohen, A Primeron Inter PartesReview,
Covered Business Method Review, and Post-GrantReview befbre the PatentTrial andAppeal Board,

24 FED. CiR. B.J. 1, 26 (2014); 35 U.S.C.
34.

§ 6(a) (2012).

The ability of patent owners to buttress the legal strength of their patents is the subject of

a fourth AIA proceeding, supplemental examination, whose purpose is limited to providing additional
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civil actions challenging the patent in court cannot obtain inter partes
review35 or post-grant review.36 Meanwhile, those who have been charged
with infringing a patent can obtain interpartes review on that patent only
within one year after being served with the complaint.37 Conversely, those
who seek covered business method review must first have been charged
with infringing the patent at issue-non-defendants need not apply.38
These features of access point toward a more explicitly
substitutionary purpose for PTAB validity reviews. The drafters of the ex
parte reexamination statute showed a light touch with regard to
supplanting the courts in patent disputes. For example, the legislative
history indicated the desirability of reexamination but declined to impose
mandatory stays of litigation pending reexamination. 9 By the time of the
AIA's enactment, however, Congress was prepared to shape the border
between courts and the Patent Office more actively through the use of
time bars, bars against a prior civil action in certain cases, and
requirements for a prior civil action in other cases as just discussed.
Congress was also prepared to impose estoppel against future proceedings
in both court40 and agency 41 settings.
B.

Court-Agency Substitution Under the PTAB

Recent detailed empirical research on usage of the PTAB,
particularly inter partes review, shows that the intended substitution of
agency review for traditional litigation is, indeed, how litigants actually
use the system. 42 Two principal modes of substitution predominate.4 3 One
is the standard model, whereby a party charged with patent infringement
in a U.S. district court action challenges the validity of the patent as a

disclosures of information material to patentability and avoid later charges of inequitable conduct that

might invalidate the patent. See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §
12, 125 Stat. 284, 325-27 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257 (2012)).
35. 35 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2012).
36. Id. § 325(a).
37. Id. § 315(b).
38. America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(B).
39. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307(1) (1980), as reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460,6463 ("The
reexamination of issued patents could be conducted with a fraction of the time and cost of formal

legal proceedings.

..

. [S]tay provisions are unnecessary in that such power already resides with the

court to prevent costly pretrial maneuvering which attempts to circumvent the reexamination

procedure.").
40. 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e)(2), 325(e)(2) (2012).
41. Id. §§ 315(e)(1), 325(e)(1).
42. Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 22, at 49.
43. Id.
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defensive response.44 The other is the nonstandard model, where a party
that has not been sued on a given patent, at least not yet, nevertheless
brings a PTAB petition to challenge the patent.4 5 Both models are
observed to a significant degree. Some 70% of those who challenge
patents in inter partes review are standard petitioners, and 30% are
nonstandard.46
Nonstandard petitioners, moreover, represent an important strategic
puzzle given their posture as preemptive strikers. Those who were
imminently about to be sued in U.S. district court and simply happened to
file first in the PTAB are rare (about 3%).47 Somewhat less rare, and more
counterintuitive, are PTAB cases with no observed parallel litigation in
the federal courts (about 13%).48 On first impression, especially in the
case of inter partes review, these latter cases would seem simply to call
undesired attention to the petitioner's potentially infringing activity. 49
There are two partial explanations to this substitutionary puzzle as well as
a larger, more strategic trend at work.
One partial explanation is that the lack of observed parallel litigation
is merely temporary and that patent owners whose rights are challenged
will soon file responsive litigation. Such litigation would be stayed by
statute, at least initially,so but would at least reveal additional valuable
information about the parties' intentions. This explanation is not a
complete account, however, as PTAB petitions without any counterpart
litigation have been observed since the earliest days of AIA review. 5
A second partial explanation is that these cases may reflect a
selection of disputes where petitioner arguments about patent invalidity
are strong and patent owner arguments about infringement are weak.5 2
This type of selection would require that both sides have adequate and
symmetric ex ante information about the relative merits of each other's
arguments.53 This sort of clarity is more likely for chemical (drugs and
medical) and potentially electrical and mechanical-related patents, as
these fields benefit from standard technical nomenclature and offer more
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
unlikely,

Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 70 (discussing PTAB cases with a parallel litigation in the offing).
Id. at 71 (discussing PTAB cases with no related litigation).
Id.
35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2) (2012).
Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 22, at 71 ("[l]t is still possible, but increasingly
that a patent owner who has not asserted a patent against an IPR or CBM challenger will do

so now.").

52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 71-72.
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easily discernible inventive boundaries.54 This is, indeed, what the data
suggest."
The larger strategic dynamic, however, requires looking not only at
nonstandard petitions or nonstandard petitioners in isolation but at both
together. The very conception of the PTAB as a substitute for the federal
courts contains within it an ambiguous choice about timing. Standard
substitution is a choice of agency over court after the patent owner's intent
to sue has been realized, whereas nonstandard substitution is the same
choice, but before (or instead of) going to court at all. The principal
difference between these choices is information about litigation risk, and
it stands to reason that coordinating with other, similarly situated actors
in the same technology or market may produce this information.
Combined data on petitions and petitioners reveals how powerful this
coordination is in practice.
Within certain technologies, there are significant disparities between
the share of inter partes review petitioners who were previously sued on
the patents that they now challenge and the share of inter partes review
petitions where at least one petitioner was previously a defendant on the
patent in question.56 For example, the disparity among drugs and medicalrelated patents is 48.5% (petitioners) vs. 70.8% (petitions). Among
mechanical-related patents, it is 53.1% vs. 70.2%." These disparities
reveal that nonstandard petitioners, who are not prior defendants, are
joining standard petitions, filed by parties who are prior defendants.59
This pattern of strategic joinder appears to be a mix of socially beneficial
collective action by patent validity challengers as well as undesirable
harassment of patent owners through serial challenges in the PTAB.60
Disentangling the two is now the subject of an extensive follow-on
empirical effort. 6
In all, court-agency substitution in the wake of the AIA highlights a
decisive shift in favor of the Patent Office as a guarantor of expertise,
lower cost, and broader access. The observed evidence of this substitution
shows that the court-agency border envisioned by the AIA's statutory time

54. Id. at 72.
55. Id. (discussing technology-specific proportions among patents involved only in PTAB
review, those involved only in federal-court litigation, and those involved in both).
56. Id. at 74.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 74-75.
61. Jay P. Kesan, Saurabh Vishnubhakat & Alan C. Marco, Serial Petitioningat the PTAB:
Joinder, Denial, Precedentand Finality, in progress.
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bars, prior civil action bars, and estoppel provisions has had a real and
meaningful effect. Naturally, these adjudicatory virtues carry important
costs as well. For example, a more widely accessible and affordable forum
is also more susceptible to abuse by those with strategic or even nefarious
purposes, such as using the threat of a PTAB challenge, with its ease of
entry and lower burdens of proof, to extract nuisance settlements from a
patent owner, to deliberately affect the stock price of the patent owner for
profit, or both.62 An even more significant tradeoff is that the Patent
Office, though an expert agency, is subject to considerable political
influence that may distort its adjudicatory process whereas the Article III
courts, though lacking technical expertise, are better protected from such
political distortions.
C.

UnreviewableAgency Discretion

The potential for political distortion in Patent Office adjudication is
especially salient because of how Congress in the AIA delegated powers
to review patent validity.63 The power actually to adjudicate the validity
of patents that are selected for review was delegated directly to the
PTAB.64 Meanwhile, the power to screen initial requests for review was
delegated to the Director, the politically appointed head of the agency.65
It is the Director who currently sub-delegates the screening power to the
PTAB, allowing each three-judge panel both to screen a petition for merit
and, if the case is selected, to conduct the actual review.6 6 Moreover, the
AIA makes the Director's screening determinations "final and
nonappealable." 67 The actual adjudication of selected cases remains
judicially reviewable, 68 but a sphere of initial agency decision-making is
beyond the reach of the Federal Circuit to oversee.
There are two problems, then, with making screening decisions
nonappealable. One is that threshold choices about what kinds of patents
will be more or less aggressively targeted for scrutiny will be made in the
62. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run fbr Its Money:
Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 284-85 (2015); Gregory Dolin,
Dubious PatentReform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 933 (2015).
63. The arguments in this section are laid out more fully in Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Disguised
Patent Policymaking, 104 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming).

64.

35 U.S.C.

§§

316(c), 326(c) (2012) (providing expressly that the "Patent Trial and Appeal

Board"-not the Director-shall conduct the administrative review proceedings).

65. Id. §§ 314, 324 (providing expressly that the "Director" shall be the one to determine
whether PTAB review is appropriate, and prescribing standards for the Director's determinations).
66. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2018).
67. 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(d), 324(e) (2012).
68. Id. §§ 319, 329.
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politically inflected setting of the Patent Office, with no judicial check on
the agency's destabilizing treatment of patent property rights.6 9 This is a
direct systemic cost of empowering the Patent Office out of a desire for
the agency's technical expertise. Still, whether this cost is likely to be
outweighed by the benefit is ultimately a policy question, and it is one that
Congress answered when crafting the AIA.
The second, more troubling problem with the nonappealability of
screening decisions is that it creates opportunities for the Patent Office to
evade even the ordinary judicial review to which it would otherwise be
subjected. Both requiring PTAB petitions to be screened for merit and
immunizing the screening decisions from review rest on the same
concern: conserving agency resources.70 Accordingly, the various criteria
by which petitions are accepted for the various kinds of AIA reviews all
require essentially the same thing: sufficient likelihood of success on the
merits." For screening to look ahead to merits adjudication in this way,
however, means that one may frame certain issues either as pertaining to
screening (and so being nonappealable) or as pertaining to adjudication
(and so being appealable). To evade judicial review, the Patent Office
need only do the former consistently.
It has done just that. As to whether petitions for interpartes review,
including the legal grounds for challenge and supporting evidence, have
been pled with the necessary "particularity," 72 the agency has argued that
its initial evaluations are exercises of its screening power and so are
immune from judicial review, even after a final agency decision has been

69. See John F. Duffy, The FederalCircuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 518, 548 (2010) (arguing that the political exercise of power by the Patent Office over
substantive patent rights would create a regime "too uncertain to foster the kinds of investments that
patent property rights are intended to foster"). Importantly, Duffy's argument about stability in
property rights is altogether distinct from the broader claim, beyond the scope of this Article, that the
government would be constitutionally constrained or forbidden from disrupting patent property rights.
See, e.g., Adam Mossoff Patents as ConstitutionalPrivate Property: The Historical Protection of
Patentsunder the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REv. 689 (2007).
70. This was carried forward from the earlier reexaminations and their requirements of a
"substantial new question of patentability," see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text, as a way
to avoid merely rehashing issues that the original patent examiner already and adequately decided.
See generally Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Towarda Viable Administrative Revocation
System br U.S. PatentLaw, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH 1, 45-46 (1997).
71. For inter partes review, this means a "reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would
prevail with respect to at least I of the claims challenged in the petition." 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012).
For covered business method review and post-grant review, it must be "more likely than not that at
least I of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable." Id. § 324(a).
72. Id. § 312(a).
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entered on the merits of the case.73 The soundness of legal argument and
the quality of evidence underlying a decision can, of course, be properly
understood as pertaining to adjudication, but the Supreme Court read the
statutory text as supporting the agency's position.74 This was the Cuozzo
decision, the first in the Court's PTAB trilogy." Since then, the Patent
Office has persistently made the same argument in other contexts as
well.76 These efforts have met with varying success, but following the
favorable baseline set in Cuozzo, the agency exercises considerable
latitude for the time being in its decisions over the validity of patents.
The result is that judicial unreviewability of screening does more
than exacerbate the costs of imposing a horizontal border between the
district courts and the Patent Office as substitutes for each other. It also
erects a second, vertical border between the Federal Circuit and the
political leadership of the Patent Office as competing overseers.
III. EMERGING COURT-AGENCY BORDERS

The foregoing account of administrative ascendancy in patent law
implicates three significant powers. First is the power to adjudicate patent
validity, and it is allocated across a horizontal border between the district
Second is the power to oversee the
courts and the Patent Office.
administrative adjudication of patent validity, and it is allocated across a
vertical border between the Patent Office leadership and the traditional
supervision of the Federal Circuit." Third, and related to the second, is
the power to interrogate the agency's reasoning and the quality of its
decision-making process. This last power is somewhat, but not solely, an
aspect of the dichotomy between internal agency oversight and external
judicial oversight. Even if the ordinary ambiguities regarding
nonappealability are resolved in the agency's favor, the Federal Circuit
may still have a further, more fundamental role in ensuring the fidelity of
the Patent Office to adjudicatory norms and the rule of law.

73. See generally Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) (No. 15-446).
74. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
75. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
76. Notable among these contexts are the statutory time bar for U.S. district court defendants
to come to the PTAB within one year of being sued, or forgo administrative altogether, as well as the
agency's obligations to issue final written decisions. See infra Section ll1.B (discussing relevant postCuozzo cases).
77. See supra Section II.B (discussing standard and nonstandard substitution).
78. See supra Section II.C (discussing judicial unreviewability of agency screening).
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PatentPowers at Stake

The border between district courts and the agency in exercising the
power to adjudicate patent validity means something more than just the
differences in the intrinsic attributes of these forums. By their own terms,
various provisions of the AIA that empower the Patent Office to
adjudicate patent validity limit that adjudicatory power. Inter partes
reviews are limited in scope and in the availability of evidence7 9 but far
less limited in time, extending even to patents that were issued prior to the
AIA.o Covered business method review and post-grant review are much
broader in scope and evidence," and while post-grant review is strictly
limited in time and applies only to post-AIA patents,82 covered business
method review also extends to pre-AIA patents. 8 3 By contrast, ordinary
judicial reevaluation of a patent's validity carries no inherent limitations
on the scope of review, the available evidence, or the types of patents that
can be reevaluated, though the court may defer to the agency on certain
burdens of proof or persuasion.
Instead, the border consists of structural provisions that direct certain
parties and disputes into one forum rather than the other through actual
mandates or prohibitions. For example, review is barred in all three AIA
proceedings where the party challenging the patent previously filed a civil
action challenging the same patent.84 Inter partesreview cannot be had if
the party challenging the patent waited more than one year since being
served with a district court complaint alleging infringement of the patent
in question." That is, nonstandard petitioners can come at any time, but
standard petitioners can wait no more than a year. By contrast, covered
business method review can be had only if the party challenging the patent
has previously been sued for infringing the patent.
Only standard
petitioners are allowed; nonstandard petitioners are barred altogether. And
all three proceedings create various estoppel effects against future
relitigation in the courts, or in the Patent Office itself, on grounds that
were raised or reasonably could have been raised during the first
proceeding."
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
(2011).
84.
85.
86.
87.

35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012).
Id. § 311(c).
Id. §321(b).
Id. § 321(c).
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
35 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)(1), 325(a)(1) (2012).
Id. § 315(b).
America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(B).
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e), 325(e); America Invents Act

§

18(a)(2), 125 Stat. 284, 330

§ 18(a)(1)(A).
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Importantly, some of these structural border provisions are initially
enforced in the agency, such as the prior civil action bars, the prior civil
action requirement, and the one-year time bar. Others, such as the agencycourt estoppel provisions, can initially be enforced only in the court after
an AIA proceeding has already taken place and the prior patent validity
challenger tries to relitigate an issue in a later civil action. The proper
enforcement of the latter is not particularly problematic, as it would be
subject to ordinary appellate correction in the Federal Circuit," and the
Federal Circuit's own potential pathologies would be subject to Supreme
Court correction.89
However, those provisions that are initially enforced in the Patent
Office may remain outside the reach of the Federal Circuit's ability to
correct. The potential for this agency indiscipline is especially stark in
light of the nonappealability statutes that protect screening decisions
about which patent validity challenges to accept for review and in light of
Patent Office efforts to recast adjudication-related issues as screeningrelated in order to resist judicial oversight.90 Indeed, one such border
provision has already been the subject of these efforts: the one-year time
bar for interpartes review.
The problem with a lack ofjudicial supervision over the AIA's courtagency border provisions would not be that internal oversight by the
agency's political leadership is necessarily inferior at producing particular
desired results. To the contrary, the Patent Office can be quite politically
responsive, and stakeholder complaints about disfavored agency policies
can lead to dramatic reversals. 9 1 Rather, the problem would be that
making even the underlying structure of patent validity review so directly
beholden to shifting political winds undermines the central purpose of the
AIA, which was to provide an improved alternative to court litigation for
reevaluating patent property rights, 92 not to replace it with industrial
policy.
The related potential effect of a Federal Circuit retreat from the
AIA's nonappealability provisions would be further, separate agency
§ 1295(a)(1)

88.

See 28 U.S.C.

89.

See Duffy, The Festo Decision, supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.

(2012).

90.
91.

See supra Section II.C.
See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, USPTO Removes Rule Changes, PATENTLYO (Oct. 14, 2009),

www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/10/uspto-removes-rule-changes.html

[https://perma.cc/FU2B-

VA36] (discussing the withdrawal of a controversial rule change governing continuation practice,
even though litigation was still pending, citing a preference for "other initiatives that would garner
more of a consensus with the patent user community").

92. See Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 22, at 49 (discussing the substitutionary
purpose of PTAB review).
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indiscipline in explaining its decision-making. Even if all those courtagency border provisions that are enforced initially in the Patent Office
were overseen only internally by the agency's own political leadershipa state of affairs that would be far from proper-the PTAB's otherwise
unreviewable decisions would still be required to give adequate and
coherent reasons and to rest on legitimate decision-making processes.93
This, too, has been a source of controversy in recent Patent Office practice
under the AIA.
In a slew of screening decisions that now number in the hundreds,
the PTAB has declined to hear otherwise meritorious challenges to patent
validity on the grounds that they are "redundant" to other challenges that
are contained in the same petition. 94 When pressed to explain the nature
of, and authority for, its redundancy-based logic, the Patent Office simply
pointed to the AIA's nonappealability provisions and claimed absolute
discretion in exercising the screening power. 95 The key request in the
appeal-a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the PTAB to
"reconsider its redundancy decision"-was denied. 96 Nevertheless, Judge
Reyna wrote separately to express his grave concern that the agency's
argument amounted to a "claim to unchecked discretionary authority" and
was "unprecedented." 97 Still, the practice remains unchecked by any
conclusive contrary Federal Circuit holding and is instead supervised at
most by internal agency leadership.
These three powers-adjudicating patent validity, overseeing agency
adjudication of patents, and interrogating agency reasoning-are highly
interrelated in how they span the border between the Patent Office and the
courts: both the district courts that now compete with the agency and the
Federal Circuit that actively supervised it before the AIA. The ways in
which parties, patents, or disputes may still traverse from court to agency
or vice-versa beyond what the AIA envisioned are still in flux, making the
border porous for the present. But solidification appears to be on the
horizon with cases that have followed Cuozzo in clarifying the procedural
structure of the PTAB.

93.
94.

See 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (2012).
The discussion that follows is detailed and theorized more fully in Saurabh Vishnubhakat,

The Non-Doctrine ofRedundancy, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming).

95.

Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys, Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1302-03 (Reyna, J.,

concurring).

96.
97.

Id. at 1299, 1302 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1303 (Reyna, J., concurring).
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Cuozzo and Its Progeny

The Court's conclusion in Cuozzo about the scope of
nonappealability rested on two important premises. One was the proper
characterization of the agency action itself. The other was the practical
effect of the action. To the first point, the Court explained that evaluating
whether the petition had been pled with particularity was quintessentially
related to institution, the screening and selection of cases for PTAB
review.98 These sorts of "mine-run" claims, the Court held, are part and
parcel of the agency's decision "under this section [§ 314]" whether to
proceed, and accordingly they are nonappealable. 99 From this, it followed
that review may still be available for other statutes less-closely related to
institution, i.e., for decisions that look less like screening and more like
adjudication. 0 0 To the second point, the Court explained further that
review may also be available for "appeals that implicate constitutional
questions" as well as for "questions of interpretation that reach, in terms
of scope and impact, well beyond [§ 314]."1"
These self-imposed limitations on the logic and limits of Cuozzo
have since manifested in two follow-on cases. One is SAS Institute v.
Iancu, now pending before the Court' 02 and another part of the PTAB
trilogy.' 03 The other is Wi-Fi One v. Broadcom Corp., just decided by the
en banc Federal Circuit.1 04
Though it is already before the Court and therefore has greater
potential to extend or even alter the Cuozzo framework, SAS Institute is a
somewhat easier case than Wi-Fi One, at least with respect to judicial
unreviewability. The question in SAS Institute is whether the PTAB must
issue a final written decision as to every patent claim that was challenged
in a PTAB petition seeking review, or merely as to every patent claim on
which the PTAB actually granted review.' 0 5
Answering this question requires evaluating first the effect of
requiring additional final written decisions about patent claims that are
challenged but not accepted for review. Because these additional patent
98.

See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2139 (2016) ("[The particularity

requirement] is an ordinary dispute about the application of certain relevant patent statutes concerning
the Patent Office's decision to institute interpartes review.").

99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 2136, 2141.
Id. at 2141.
Id.
No. 16-969 (Sup. Ct., filed Jan. 31, 2017).

103.

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

104.
105.
969).

878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu (U.S. Jan. 31, 2017) (No. 16-
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claims were initially screened out, directing the agency to go back and
address them anyway would, in the view of the Patent Office, violate the
nonappealability statute. 106 Under Cuozzo, however, the agency's
obligation to issue a complete, statutorily compliant final written decision
is considerably "less closely related" to institution under § 314 than was
the particularity requirement of § 312.107 Put another way, the agency's
final decision is unconcerned with screening and squarely concerned with
adjudication.
The "scope and impact" of the final written decision, too, extends
well beyond the institution decision-indeed, beyond the agency itself. It
is the issuance of a final written decision that triggers estoppel,'os a
structural feature of the court-agency border that necessarily implicates
subsequent court proceedings. Conversely, even if the agency's
obligations as to the final written decision were to be constrained by what
arguments the PTAB initially rejected, that exercise of the screening
power would, by the same token, have a scope and impact that were
deeply felt throughout the proceeding as well as in estoppel effects upon
subsequent proceedings. This, too, would counsel review under Cuozzo.
The closer case, albeit not yet before the Court,' 0 9 is Wi-Fi One. The
question in that case was whether the one-year time bar for inter partes
review is subject to the nonappealability provision that governs PTAB
decisions of whether to grant review.'o The position of the Patent Office
remained that the time bar provision defines a category of cases for which
review "may not be instituted"'' and is screening-related, just as the
particularity requirement in Cuozzo was." 2
There are at least two notable problems with this reading." 3 One is
that it assumes the conclusion of relatedness under Cuozzo. That
106. See Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu (U.S. Apr. 5,
2017) (No. 16-969).
107. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141 (2016).
108. 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e), 325(e) (2012).
109. The en banc decision was handed down on January 4, 2018. 878 F.3d 1364. The deadline
for certiorari, meanwhile, will run 90 days from the Federal Circuit's entry ofjudgment. SUP. CT. R.

13.
110.

Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 851 F.3d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (granting the petition

for rehearing en banc and setting forth the en banc question).

111. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012).
112. See En Banc Brief for Intervenor Michelle K. Lee, Director, United States Patent and
Trademark Office, Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., Nos. 2015-1944, -1945, -1946, 2017 WL
1132930, *9 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 1, 2017) ("Section 315(b) exemplifies the kind of institution-specific
determination for which Congress intended to foreclose appeals.").

113. The arguments first developed in this Article, then a working paper, were the basis for an
en banc amicus curiae brief in Wi-Fi One. See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Patent and
Administrative Law in Support of Neither Party, Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., Nos. 2015-
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conclusion, however, must begin with what the statutory provision
actually achieves and must then relate to institution "under this section [§
314]."14 For example, the reason why the particularity requirement at
issue in Cuozzo was related to institution is that evaluating a petition's
requisite likelihood of success under § 314(a), one must consider the
contents of the petition, and the particularity requirement was one of
several statutory prescriptions for that content.'
By contrast, applying the one-year time bar does not similarly
contribute to the evaluation, under § 314(a), of whether a petition is likely
to succeed on the merits. A petition may be virtually certain to result in
the cancellation of all the challenged patent claims-and still be barred
from going forward-if the party seeking review was sued on the same
patent more than one year earlier. Thus, the relation of the one-year time
bar to the actual screening decision is minimal. At most, one can say that
they both take place during the same initial phase of PTAB review.
Moreover, the one-year time bar is one of the procedural pillars on
which rests the border that allocates power between the courts and the
Patent Office. Just as the estoppel-triggering effect of a final written
decision in SAS Institute bears out significant scope and impact, so also
do the exclusionary effects of the one-year time bar. Allowing a patent to
be challenged in the Patent Office more than one year after it was asserted
against the would-be challenger is not a choice that can be contained
within the agency. Its impacts necessarily reach well outside the agency
and into the district courts, where it frustrates the ability of patent owners
to find repose against new parallel disputes in the PTAB. 116 It also
frustrates the ability of courts themselves to manage resources effectively
when, even after considerable judicial investment in a case, the Patent
Office can still allow the defendant to start again as a PTAB petitioner.
The year-and-a-half since the Court decided Cuozzo was a significant
transition period for the PTAB, especially because the outcome in that
first case vindicated the expansive position that the Patent Office had
staked out. Had the outcome been a finding of reviewability, for example,
it is likely that the Patent Office's subsequent campaign to conflate
screening and adjudication in order to resist judicial review would have
2017), www.ssrn.com/abstract-2923316
Feb.
23,
(Fed. Cir.
-1946
1944, -1945,
[https://perma.cc/D5AR-9JGP] [hereinafter Professors' Briefj.
114. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016).
115. Id. at 2142 ("Cuozzo's claim that Garmin's petition was not pleaded 'with particularity'
under § 312 is little more than a challenge to the Patent Office's conclusion, under
'information presented in the petition' warranted review.").

116.
117.

Professors' Brief, supra note 113, at 14.
Id.

§ 314(a), that

the
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been more muted or even have stopped. Instead, the court-agency border
has become more porous, not less, through the agency's arguments about
its discretion, immunity from judicial review, and ability to self-supervise.
Now at the end of this transition period, SAS Institute has some potential
to elaborate the outer bounds of Cuozzo. The more revealing lesson and
solidifying force, however, seems to be the Federal Circuit's en banc
opinion in Wi-Fi One, released early this year.
IV. WI-FI ONE

AND THE WAY FORWARD

In Wi-Fi One, the nine-judge en banc majority concluded that the
one-year time bar for inter partes review is, indeed, subject to judicial
review notwithstanding the nonappealability provision."' The opinion
offers clarifications about the practical reach of Cuozzo as well as
indications of how effectively the court-agency border contemplated by
the AIA is likely to serve its purposes in the future." 9
A.

The En Banc Decision

The focus of the opinion was primarily the balance of adjudicatory
power between the district courts and the Patent Office. The majority
recognized that by forbidding inter partes review where the petition
comes more than one year after the petitioner has been served with a
district court complaint for infringement, the time bar forces a
substitutionary choice.' 20 That choice is to come to the agency within a
year, or else not to come at all.' 2 ' In the court's view, this border-enforcing
function makes the time bar qualitatively-indeed, "fundamentally"different from requirements, such as particularity, that pertain to the
contents of a petition.1 22
In addition to the relatedness inquiry of Cuozzo, the en banc majority
in Wi-Fi One briefly addressed two other issues. One was the "scope and
impact" inquiry, which is also satisfied by the one-year time bar. The other

118. Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
119. The discussion that follows in this section was simplified and separately published as a
blog post shortly after the en banc decision was issued. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Shenanigans,
Time Bars,
and Federal Circuit Oversight,
PATENTLYO
(Jan.
10,
2018),
www.patentlyo.com/patent/2018/01/shenanigans-federal-oversight.html
[https://perma.cc/3P35UZRF].
120. See Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1374 ("[The one-year time bar] governs the relation of IPRs to
other proceedings or actions, including actions taken in district court.").
121. Id.
122. Id.
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issue was whether Cuozzo had changed the baseline for precluding
judicial review.
Because the Court in Cuozzo had held that routine determinations,
"mine-run claims," and the like were unreviewable, the exceptions that
the Court took care to enumerate attracted considerable attention. Review
could still be available, the Cuozzo majority reassured, for constitutional
issues, for less closely institution-related statutes, for issues of broader
scope and impact, and for plainly ultra vires agency actions.123 These socalled "shenanigans" would not escape judicial scrutiny. 124 Consequently,
much of the debate surrounding Wi-Fi One was over whether the time bar,
or anything else, was a shenanigan that could fit into one of these itemized
exceptions.
The en banc majority explained, however, that the inquiry did not
begin with Cuozzo's exceptions. Rather, the APA baseline is still the
presumed availability of judicial review.' 2 5 The presumption was
overcome in Cuozzo by the requisite "clear and convincing evidence."' 26
Broadcom, however, still had to overcome the presumption from scratch
in the present case, and ultimately did not carry its burden.' 2 7 This
jurisprudential point is a valuable reference marker in the en banc majority
opinion, as it reiterated that the presumption of reviewability remains the
default rule.' 2 8
Meanwhile, the case also drew a four-judge dissent.129 In it, Judge
Hughes read the nonappealability language of § 314(d) broadly,
embracing all decisions whether to institute, not just decisions that turn
on the petition's reasonable likelihood of success.' 3 0 In support, the
dissent drew a textual comparison to threshold determinations in
reexamination, which were also nonappealable.1 3 ' In reexamination,
however, what were shielded from judicial scrutiny were affirmative
determinations to proceed but not negative determinations to withhold
review.' 32 The text of interpartes review's nonappealability, by contrast,

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141-42 (2016).
Id. at 2142.
Id. at 2140.
Id.
Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1367.

128.

Saurabh Vishnubbakat, Court-Agency Allocations of Power and the Limits of Cuozzo,

PATENTLYO (May 5, 2017), www.patentlyo.com/patent/2017/05/agency-allocations-limits.html
[https://perma.cc/D8NC-BAYQ].
Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1377 (Hughes, J., dissenting).
129.
130. Id. at 1379.
131. Id. at 1380-81.
132. Id.
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shields all determinations whether positive or negative.133 This textual
difference, the dissent said, meant that the unreviewability of an AIA
screening decision did not depend on its outcome and so should not
depend on its origins, either.134 Whether based on likelihood of success,
timeliness, or any other input, decisions about institution should be
beyond judicial reach.' 3 5
The dissent also raised an interesting argument, counseling against
judicial review, based on a colloquy in Cuozzo itself between Justice
Breyer's opinion for the majority and Justice Alito's dissent.13 6 The
dissent had complained of how broadly the majority had swept in finding
unreviewability, arguing specifically as an example that the majority's
reasoning would prohibit judicial review of the one-year time bar as
well.' 3 7 The reason for this, according to Justice Alito, was that "the
petition's timeliness, no less than the particularity of its allegations, is
closely tied to the application and interpretation of statutes related to the
Patent Office's decision to initiate . .. review."' 3 8 The Cuozzo majority,
meanwhile, pushed back against the dissent's other negative predictions
but remained silent about timeliness.1' By the time of Wi-Fi One, this
colloquy from Cuozzo suggested a potential consensus on the Court that
the one-year time bar was, like the particularity requirement, also
judicially unreviewable.1 4 0
One rejoinder to this argument is that Justice Alito's comparison to
the one-year time bar was a rhetorical position aimed at building a
majority and, once it was clear that he would be in dissent, aimed at
limiting the impact of the majority's reasoning.'4 1 The Cuozzo majority,
after all, took pains to enumerate the many issues that it did not decide.1 4 2
To infer from the majority's silence a consensus about an even more
nuanced issue would be simply implausible.
Notably, the dissent did not address the "scope and impact" inquiry
with respect to the one-year time bar.1 43 Functional considerations about
interbranch respect for the relation between the Patent Office and the
133. Id. at 1381.
134. Vishnubhakat, Shenanigans,supra note 119.
135. Id.
136. See Vishnubhakat, Court-Agency Allocations of Power, supra note 128.
137. Id.
138. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2155 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 2141-42 (majority opinion).
140. Judge Chen raised this point explicitly during the Federal Circuit's en banc oral argument.
Vishnubhakat, Court-Agency Allocations of Power, supra note 128.
141. Id.
142. Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2141-42.
143. Vishnubhakat, Shenanigans, supra note 119.
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courts, which were salient to both Justice Breyer's majority opinion in
Cuozzo and Judge Reyna's en banc majority opinion in Wi-Fi One, were
absent from Judge Hughes's dissent.144
B.

Patent Power Effects

The Wi-Fi One decision represents a specific and informative
Federal Circuit understanding of nonappealability in PTAB review. Being
"closely related"1 4 5 to institution for Cuozzo purposes will generally be
satisfied by showing logical relation between the statute in question and
the "reasonable likelihood" standard for screening petitions under §
314(a).146 A reasonable likelihood, in turn, is "clearly about whether the
claims are unpatentable on the grounds asserted." 47 Those statutory
requirements that bear on anticipating the substantive outcome will more
likely be found "closely related," and vice-versa. 148
This approach suggests two important implications for the emergent
border between the courts and the Patent Office. The first pertains to
judicial review over other structural provisions that make up the courtagency border after the AIA. The second pertains to potential next steps
for a growing body of case decisions that offer compelling guidance on
these issues.
The analytical framework of Cuozzo and the elaboration from Wi-Fi
One, taken together, generally counsel in favor of judicial review over the
other structural provisions that primarily make up the post-AIA border
between the courts and the Patent Office. For example, the bars on prior
civil actions by the alleged infringer in inter partes review1 4 9 and postgrant review150 are both likely to be reviewable. Both provisions are
unrelated to the screening of cases under § 314(a) because neither pertains
to whether a patent is likely to be found unpatentable in the present PTAB
challenge. Instead, these statutory bars pertain to litigation activity by the
would-be petitioner.
Likewise, the requirement in covered business method review of a
prior offensive civil action by the patent owner against the petitioner5 1 is

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
(2011).

Id.
Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2141.
Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
Id. (citing Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2140) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
35 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2012).
Id. § 325(a).
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1)(B), 125 Stat. 284, 330
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likely to be judicially reviewable. This provision, too, is unrelated to
whether a patent is likely to be found unpatentable. Both sets of statutory
provisions, like the one-year time bar, pertain to the litigation activity of
parties (i.e., attributes extrinsic to the substance of the petition and the
validity of the patent).
This is even more true for the provisions that govern agency-agency
estoppel and agency-court estoppel.152 Far from being related to the
likelihood that a challenged patent will be found partly or fully invalid,
these provisions are not even triggered until after a final written decision
has been entered on the case at hand. They are entirely forward-looking
and are also both likely to be reviewable under Cuozzo and Wi-Fi One.
As for next steps, it is certainly possible that Broadcom will seek
review in the Supreme Court. 15 3 However, given the decision in Cuozzo
itself and the pending controversy in SAS Institute, granting certiorari in
Wi-Fi One would bring the Court for a third time into the specific issue of
nonappealability and Federal Circuit oversight. 154 Although the en banc
dissent presents a plausible line of argument in support of certiorari, either
outcome in SAS Institute may render moot the need for more clarification.
Having reached a decision of unreviewability in Cuozzo, a decision in SAS
Institute for judicial review would leave Wi-Fi One an unnecessary third
case. This would especially hold true if the Court saw SAS Institute as a
closer case than Wi-Fi One, as the facts of the latter case would do little
to clarify the line between review and no review.
By contrast, if SAS Institute came out the other way, in favor of
unreviewability, then the result would be two Supreme Court holdings
that denied review and one en banc Federal Circuit holding that granted
it. The Court could also reasonably regard this as sufficient guidance on
the question of Federal Circuit oversight in cases of PTAB validity
review. The result would be the same: a denial of certiorari in Wi-Fi One.
V. CONCLUSION

The Wi-Fi One decision reflects a welcome recognition by the
Federal Circuit of the vital procedural structure that stands between the
federal courts and the Patent Office. This court-agency border is a bulwark
against the capacious view that the agency has taken of its own discretion
and immunity from judicial oversight in conducting patent validity
reviews under the AIA. Moreover, this border represents the intention of
152.
153.
154.

35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e), 325(e).
See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
Vishnubhakat, Shenanigans, supra note 119.
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Congress to allocate power differently between the courts and the Patent
Office, but not to divest either institution completely.
Understood in this way, even a porous court-agency border remains
a valuable antidote to a perceived mandate for the agency to govern itself
unaccountable to any judicial power. The tendency of the Patent Office as
an administrative agency to push the limits of its jurisdiction and to
aggrandize itself, even in service of sincerely held policy goals, is
understandable, perhaps even commonplace in the modern administrative
state. 15 Nevertheless, unlike agencies that routinely exercise this sort of
power, the ability to make substantive legal pronouncements is still new
in the patent system's experience, and the window for reform has not
passed.

155.

See, e.g., Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chevron Deference,

Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1503-07 (2009); Perez v.
Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).

